ACCR’s BP AGM speech: the case for capex transparency

At BP's much anticipated 2026 AGM, one of the co-filers of Resolution 24, ACCR had planned, as is customary, to present a speech in support of the resolution, but said it was not given the opportunity to do so.

ACCR said it had been informed in advance that it would not be able to present the resolution because of time constraints and pointed out that shareholders who co-filed resolutions at previous BP AGM’s had been given the right to speak. According to people briefed on the arrangements, no speaking slots were allocated to external speakers, although time was expected to be made available for questions during the AGM.

Below is the planned speech by Sarah Brewin ahead of the meeting.

In person: NZI Climate Solutions Summit | 23 June 2026

Chair, members of the board, and fellow shareholders,

My name is Sarah Brewin from ACCR, and I am speaking in support of Resolution 24 on behalf of its co-filers, including Nest, Greater Manchester Pension Fund, Merseyside Pension Fund, Wales Pension Partnership and PUBLICA – all long-term shareholders in BP.

At the heart of Resolution 24 is a simple question: is BP allocating capital in a way that actually creates value for long-term shareholders? The co-filers have tabled this resolution asking for better disclosure so that we, as owners, can answer that question with confidence.

BP has underperformed its sector peers over three, five and ten years. In our view, that points to a persistent problem with value creation. The company appears to have diagnosed this problem as one of going ‘too far, too fast’ on energy transition investments – a problem that can be corrected by cutting low carbon capex and growing capital allocation to the upstream business.

The facts paint a different picture. This is why Resolution 24 asks the company to give investors the information they need to be assured that its upstream growth strategy is being executed with sufficient discipline. Resolution 24 focuses on three essential elements of capital discipline.

First, cost-competitiveness.
In a global market, projects that sit higher on the cost curve are more exposed to downside risk. Yet BP, unlike its European peers Shell and Total, does not show how it accounts for this. ACCR analysis suggests many of BP’s pre-FID assets are relatively high-cost, increasing the risk of value erosion. Based on our analysis of independent data, Tiber is more expensive than 81% of global pre-FID supply. Shareholders need greater clarity on how BP assesses project competitiveness before final investment decisions are made.

Second, project execution.
Cost overruns and delays are rife across the oil and gas industry. But it is unclear whether BP systematically incorporates its own execution track record into its investment decisions. Our research shows that if all of BP’s pre-FID projects incurred just a 1-year delay and a 20% cost overrun, that would reduce the value of its pre-FID portfolio by 66%. Shareholders need to understand whether BP is applying realistic assumptions, because if it is not, projects may be overvalued from the outset - undermining returns.

Third, exploration.
BP has been spending around $1.4bn per year on exploration and intends to increase this – to ‘reload the hopper’ and increase exploration capex by an unspecified amount. Yet ACCR research shows that on average, every dollar that the oil and gas sector spent on conventional exploration since the year 2000 has destroyed 71 cents. Our analysis of BP’s own exploration outcomes suggests declining success rates and rising costs. Shareholders deserve to understand how BP ensures this growth in exploration spending is creating long-term value.

These are fundamental issues. And yet, this resolution is modest in what it asks. It does not challenge strategy or prescribe outcomes. It simply asks for transparency on how capital discipline is applied in practice.

This matters even more in the current governance context at BP.

Many investors are concerned by BP’s recent actions that we believe limits shareholder engagement - including the exclusion of a shareholder resolution and the proposal to allow the company to unilaterally decide whether investors can physically attend AGMs. At a time of strategic change, shareholders need more transparency and dialogue, not less.

Resolution 24 is a constructive way to reinforce that accountability. If the company’s capital allocation processes are as robust as stated, then enhanced disclosure should only strengthen investor confidence.

With new leadership now in place, there is an opportunity to set a clear tone - one of transparency, discipline, and respect for shareholders. Resolution 24 supports that direction.

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